Dans cet article, nous cherchons à caractériser les effets dynamiques des chocs technologiques permanents et la façon dont les autorités monétaires européennes y ont réagi au cours des deux dernières décennies. Pour ce faire, nous développons un modèle d'équilibre général à prix et salaires visqueux que nous estimons en minimisant la distance entre les réponses théoriques des variables d'intérêt et leurs contreparties empiriques issues d'un VAR structutel. Dans une seconde étape, nous conduisons un exercice contre-factuel consistant à comparer ces réponses avec celles qu'implique la politique monétaire optimale. L'exercice débouche sur l'existence d'un écart signiÞcatif entre ces réponses. Ceci suggère la possibilité que la réponse des autorités monétaires européennes n'ait pas été optimale sur la période considérée.
Résumé non technique :
A l'aide de restrictions de long-terme mises en oeuvre dans un modèle VAR structurel (VARS) estimé sur les données de la zone euro sur la période 1980(1)-2002(4), nous étudions la dynamique de la croissance du produit, de l'inßation, de l'inßation salariale, et du taux d'intérêt nominal de court terme en réponse à des chocs technologiques permanents, aÞn de caractériser la façon dont les autorités monétaires européennes ont réagi à ces chocs au cours des deux dernières décennies. 
Non-technical summary:
Using standard long-run restrictions in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) estimated on euro area data over the sample 1980(1)-2002(4), we study the response of output growth, inßation, wage inßation, and the short-term nominal interest rate to permanent technology shocks, so as to characterize the way in which European monetary authorities reacted to these shocks over the past two decades. We then propose a possible rationalization of these responses within a small dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices and wages designed and estimated so as to replicate these responses as closely as possible. Armed with this structural representation of the data, and contingent upon the estimated parameters, we conduct a counterfactual experiment designed to quantify the extent to which the historical systematic response of European monetary authorities to permanent technology shocks differs from the optimal response. 1 We estimate our DSGE model by resorting to the Minimum Distance Estimation (MDE) technique recently advocated by Christiano et al. (2001) and Woodford (1997,1999) , among others. More precisely, the structural parameters of the DSGE models are pinned down so as to minimize a weighted distance between theoretical and VAR-based impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a permanent technology shock. As in Woodford (1997, 1999) and Christiano et al. (2001) , our Minimum Distance strategy allows us to estimate the model by focussing on a single shock, thus avoiding the hassle of fully specifying the stochastic structure of the economy. Importantly, according to our SVAR, technology shocks account for a sizable portion of the business cycle components of of inßation, wage inßation, and Our setup incorporates prices and wages both sticky, material goods, and features various hybrid elements, including habit persistence and partial wage and price indexation schemes.
All these modelling elements have been shown to be important in terms of empirical Þt. An important aspect of our modelling strategy is that by considering prices and wages both sticky, we end up with a non trivial optimal monetary policy, as opposed to a policy consisting to shut down inßation.
Armed with these parameters estimates and a model that does a reasonably good job of reproducing the economy's response to identiÞed technology shocks, we then go on to compute the optimal response to these shocks. Our main result is that European monetary authorities dynamic reaction to a permanent technology shock does not appear to have been optimal over the sample period studied in this paper. In particular, the historical responses of the nominal interest rate and inßation have been too timid and too pronounced, respectively, when compared with the outcome of the optimal monetary policy.
Introduction
Using standard long-run restrictions in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) estimated on euro area data over the sample 1980(1)-2002(4), we study the response of output growth, inßation, wage inßation, and the short-term nominal interest rate to permanent technology shocks. Doing so allows us to characterize the way in which European monetary authorities reacted to these shocks over the past two decades. We then propose a possible rationalization of these responses within a small dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky prices and wages designed and estimated so as to replicate these responses as closely as possible. Armed with this structural representation of the data, and contingent upon the estimated parameters, we conduct a counterfactual experiment designed to quantify the extent to which the historical systematic response of European monetary authorities to permanent technology shocks differs from the optimal response. 2 We estimate our DSGE model by resorting to the Minimum Distance Estimation (MDE) technique recently advocated by Christiano et al. (2001) and Woodford (1997,1999) , among others. More precisely, the structural parameters of the DSGE models are pinned down so as to minimize a weighted distance between theoretical and VAR-based impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a permanent technology shock.
As in Woodford (1997, 1999) and Christiano et al. (2001) , our Minimum Distance strategy allows us to estimate the model by focussing on a single shock, thus avoiding the hassle of fully specifying the stochastic structure of the economy. As a consequence, if the shock of interest accounts for a small fraction of ßuctuations in the business cycle components of the relevant variables, our limited information estimation is of limited interest. As it turns out, however, according to our SVAR, technology shocks account for a sizable portion of the business cycle components of of inßation, wage inßation, and the nominal interest rate, when the latter are deÞned by means of the band pass Þlter advocated by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) . It is thus legitimate to focus on technology shocks when analyzing European monetary policy. 
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Our setup incorporates prices and wages both sticky, material goods, and features various hybrid elements, including habit persistence and partial wage and price indexation schemes. All these modelling elements have been shown elsewhere in the literature to help New Keynesian DSGE models better Þt US as well as euro area data. In this paper, we conÞrm this conclusion: most of the associated parameters are found signiÞcant and allow the DSGE model to replicate fairly well the economy's response to technology shocks. An important aspect of our modelling strategy is that by considering prices and wages both sticky, we end up with a non trivial optimal monetary policy, as opposed to a policy consisting to shut down inßation.
A possible drawback of our analysis is that we must a priori specify a monetary policy rule before estimating the model. Thus, our answer to the question asked at the beginning of the paper is clearly contingent upon this rule. Yet, it seems at Þrst desirable to resort to a parsimonious rule which allows us to synthesize the complex process of monetary policy with a small number of parameters. Such rules have been successfully estimated for a number of countries, including an aggregate of European countries. 3 Within the context of a fully speciÞed, estimated DSGE model, Smets and Wouters (2003) also show that such a parsimonious rule captures the essential features of European monetary policy. An interesting preliminary result is that European monetary authorities' systematic response to technology shocks, as implied by the structural VAR, is very well approximated by a simple Taylor-like rule within the conÞnes of our DSGE model. Armed with these parameters estimates and a model that does a reasonably good job of reproducing the economy's response to identiÞed technology shocks, we then go on to compute the optimal response to these shocks. To do so, we follow Giannoni and Woodford (2003) and derive the monetary authorities loss function as a second-order approximation to the social utility function. Our main result is that European monetary authorities dynamic reaction to a permanent technology shock does not appear to have been optimal over the sample period studied in this paper. In particular, the historical responses of the nominal interest rate and inßation have been too timid and too pronounced, respectively, when compared with the outcome of the optimal monetary policy. These results should be taken with caution since the model 
Supply Shocks and Monetary Policy in a SVAR
In this section, we describe how we identify technology shocks in our SVAR model of the euro area economy. We then discuss our results and emphasize that technology shocks, as deÞned below, are not a negligible source of ßuctuation at business cycle frequencies.
Structural VAR Estimation
To identify permanent supply shocks, we simply follow the Blanchard and Quah (1989) tradition of assuming that only these shocks can affect the long-run level of output. The data used in our estimation are extracted from the AWM database compiled by Fagan et al. (2001) , and consist of real output growth (∆ŷ t ), inßation (π t ), wage inßation (π w t ), and the short term nominal interest rate (î t ). Our sample period ranges from 1980(Q1) to 2002(Q4). Over this period, inßation, wage inßation, and the nominal interest rate all display a marked and signiÞcant downward trend. This phenomenon is due to the process of convergence of member countries. 4 Following Coenen and Wieland (2000), we acknowledge that our model is not designed to take account of this process. We thus simply extract quadratic trends from our original dataseries.
The transformed data are graphed on Þgure 1.
Formally, let us consider the data vector z t = (∆ŷ t ,π t ,π w t ,î t ) 0 . We estimate the canonical VAR
where % is the maximal lag, which we determine by sequential likelihood ratio tests. Let us
, where I m is the identity matrix and m is the number of variables in z t . Now, we assume that the canonical innovations are linear combinations of the structural shocks η t , i.e. ε t = Sη t , for some non singular matrix S. As usual, we impose an orthogonality assumption on the structural shocks, which combined with a scale normalization implies Eη t η 0 t = I m . Since we are only identifying a single shock, we need not impose a complete set of restrictions on the matrix S. Let us deÞne C (L) = B (L) S. Given the ordering of z t , we simply require that C (1) be lower triangular, so that only technology shocks can affect the long-run level of output. This amounts to imposing that C (1) is the Cholesky factor of B (1) ΣB (1) 0 . Given consistent estimates of B (1) and Σ, we easily obtain an estimate for C (1). Retrieving S is then a simple task using the formula S = B (1)
A word of caution is in order before proceeding. One might argue that what we identify is a broader set of shocks than technology shocks in the strict sense. Indeed output might respond to a host of other permanent shocks and the latter should not be interpreted as technology shocks.
In order to avoid this problem, Galí (1999) proposed to substitute average labor productivity growth for output growth in the SVAR. Unfortunately, this strategy is not an option for us because time series of hours worked per employee are not available for the euro area. Thus our deÞnition of technology shocks is broader than Galí's, but, at the same time, is consistent with that proposed by Hansen and Prescott (1993), i.e. "changes in the production functions or, more generally, the production possibility sets of the proÞt centers". 5 5 Other papers that adopt the same interpretation include Ambler et al. (1999) , Beaudry and Guay (1996) , and Cogley and Nason (1995). 9 
Results
The dynamics of output growth, inßation, wage inßation, and the nominal interest rate in response to a one percent technology shock are reported on Þgure 2. The grey area represents the 95% asymptotic conÞdence intervals, which we computed numerically.
As the Þgure makes clear, output growth rises on impact, though not signiÞcantly. After a small inßexion in the second quarter, changes in real output gradually reach their steady state value form above. Inßation is irresponsive to a technology shock on impact, though this shock triggers a signiÞcantly negative path after one or two quarters. Inßation dynamics have an inverted hump-shape, since inßation continues to decline for two quarters before starting to reach its steady state level. A similar inverted hump-shaped pattern obtains for the short term interest rate. The latter is suggestive of an accommodative behavior of European monetary authorities over our sample. The latter seem to have reacted to technology shocks by a protracted decline in nominal interest rate. Finally, wage inßation also declines after a positive technology shock, though this response is not precisely estimated.
To quantify the importance of technology shocks over the business cycle, we proceed as follows. From the estimated VAR coefficients, we construct the series of output, inßation, wage inßation, and the nominal interest rate that would have obtained absent technology shocks. We then Þlter these series using the band pass Þlter advocated by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) .
In the implementation of this Þlter, we retain the traditional deÞnition of the business cycle as those movements between 6 and 32 quarters. The same Þlter is applied on the original series.
We can thus compute the contribution of technology shocks to the variance of the business cycle components of each series. 6 The Þltered series are reported on Þgure 3.
We obtain that technology shocks account for 29% and 21% of the variance of inßation and wage inßation, respectively, at business cycle frequencies. This proportion, though not dominant, is non negligible. What more, technology shocks explain 86% of business cycle ßuctuations of the short term nominal interest rate. In contrast, they only account for 13% of the variance of output at business cycle frequencies. Overall, this variance decomposition exercise suggests that it is legitimate that euro area monetary authorities pay some attention to technology shocks given their relative importance over the business cycle.
The Model
The model has six sectors. 
Final Goods and Materials Goods
Competitive Þrms produce a homogeneous Þnal good with the inputs of intermediate goods,
according to the CES technology
where y t is the quantity of Þnal good produced in period t and y t (ς) is the input of intermediate good ς. Intermediate goods are imperfectly substitutable, with substitution elasticity θ p > 1.
The zero proÞt condition for Þnal good producers implies that the aggregate price index obeys the relationship
Another set of competitive Þrms produce material goods by combining the same intermediate 7 A detailed technical appendix is available from the authors upon request. 11 goods as above. They have access to the CES technology
where q t is the produced quantity of material goods and q t (ς) denotes the input of intermediate good ς. Notice that the technologies for producing Þnal and material goods share the same substitution elasticity between any two intermediate goods. Accordingly, the price of materials goods will be P t .
Let d t (ς) denote the overall demand addressed to the producer of intermediate good ς. The above assumptions imply the following relationship
This is the demand function that monopolist ς will take into account when solving her program.
Aggregate Labor Index
Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume for convenience that a set of differentiated labor inputs, indexed on [0, 1], are aggregated into a single labor index h t by competitive Þrms, which will be referred to as labor intermediaries in the sequel. They produce the aggregate labor input according to the following CES technology
where θ w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two labor types. Let W t (υ) denote the nominal wage rate associated to type-υ labor, which labor intermediaries take as given. The
Þrst order conditions are
where the aggregate nominal wage is deÞned as
Notice that eq. (7) is a direct consequence of the combination of eq. (6) and the zero proÞts condition.
Intermediate Goods
In the third sector, monopolistic 
where F (·) is an increasing and concave production function, n t (ς) is the input of aggregate labor, m t (ς) denotes the input of material goods, and s m is the share of materials goods in value added. This speciÞcation is borrowed from Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) . Finally, z t is a productivity shock which evolves according to
where g > 1 is the average, gross growth rate of technical progress, and 9 t ∼ iid(0, σ 2 ) ). 8 Additionally, we assume that monopolistic producers of intermediate goods are subsidized at rate τ p . Furthermore, we assume that this rate is such that the monopoly distortion is completely eliminated.
Over the recent past, a number of authors have argued that including material goods in New Keynesian models is important for obtaining a good empirical Þt. 9 In the present paper, following suggestions in Woodford (2003) , the material goods device plays an important role in strengthening the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting decisions, given that monopolistic Þrms have access to an aggregate labor market.
Cost minimization ensures that
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in each period of time, a monopolistic Þrm can reoptimize its price with probability 1 − α p , irrespective of the elapsed time since it last revised its price. The remaining Þrms simply rescale their price according to the simple rule P T (ς) =
where π t ≡ P t /P t−1 represents the (gross) inßation rate, π is the steady state inßation rate, and γ p ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available inßation measure.
This is an extension of the inßation indexation mechanism considered in Woodford (2003) . While with the latter a hybrid new Phillips is only valid in the neighborhood of a zero-inßation steady state, the former enables us to consider strictly positive steady state inßation rates.
Since Þrm ς is a monopoly supplier, it will take the demand function (4) into account when setting its price. Additionally, it takes into account the fact that this price rate will presumably hold for more than one period -except for the automatic revisions. Now, let P * t (ς) denote the price chosen in period t, and let d * t,T (ς) denote the production of good ς in period T if Þrm ς last reoptimized its price in period t. According to eq. (4), d * t,T (ς) obeys the relationship
Then, P * t (ς) is selected so as to maximize
, where E ς t {·} is an expectation operator speciÞc to Þrm ς that integrates over those future states of the world in which Þrm ς has no reset its price since t. Standard manipulations yield the approximate loglinear relation
whereπ t is the logdeviation of π t ,ŷ t andŵ t are the logdeviations of y t e −zt and w t e −zt , respec-tively, 10 and where we deÞned the composite parameter
Here, F (n), F 0 (n), and F 00 (n) denote the values of F and its Þrst and second derivatives, evaluated at the steady state value of n.
Households
The economy is inhabited by differentiated households, indexed on [0, 1]. A typical household υ acts as a monopoly supplier of type-υ labor. It is assumed that at each point in time only a fraction 1 − α w of the households can set a new wage, which will remain Þxed until the next time period the household is allowed to reset its wage. The remaining households simply revise their wages according to the simple rule
where π w is the steady state wage inßation rate and γ w ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available wage inßation measure. Notice that contrary to Christiano et al.
(2001) and Woodford (2003) , we let the households index their nominal wage inßation to past wage inßation rather than past inßation alone. We assume that households are subsidized at rate τ w . Furthermore, we assume that this rate is such that the monopoly distortion is completely eliminated.
In addition, a typical household must select a sequence of consumptions and nominal bonds holdings. As such, the above described problem makes the choices of wealth accumulation contingent upon a particular history of wage rate decisions, thus leading to households heterogeneity.
For the sake of tractability, we assume that the momentary utility function is separable across consumption and leisure. Combining this with the assumption of a complete set of contingent claims market, all the households will make the same choices regarding consumption and will only differ by their wage rate and technology of labor. This is directly reßected in our notations.
Household υ's goal in life is to maximize
where E t is the expectation operator, conditional on information available as of time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, V(·) is a well-behaved utility functions, and b ∈ (0, 1).
The variable c t represents consumption and h t (υ) is household υ's technology of labor. The preferences are characterized by internal habit formation.
The representative agent maximizes (13) subject to the sequence of constraints
where div t denotes proÞts redistributed by monopolistic Þrms and w t (υ) ≡ W t (υ) /P t is the real wage rate earned by type-υ labor. Additionally, b t ≡ B t /P t , where B t denotes nominal bonds acquired in period t and maturing in period t + 1; ξ t denotes lump-sum taxes; i t denotes the gross nominal interest rate.
The Þrst order conditions with respect to c t and b t are
Let us deÞneî t andĉ t as the logdeviations of i t and c t e −zt , respectively, andλ t as that of λ t e z t . Additionally, let us deÞneb = b/g. We thus obtain the approximate loglinear Þrst order
where we deÞned
Let us now consider the wage setting decision confronting a household drawn to reoptimize its nominal wage rate in period t, say household υ. In the sequel, it will be convenient to deÞne wage inßation π w t ≡ W t /W t−1 . Since the household is a monopoly supplier, it will take the demand function (6) into account when setting its wage. Additionally, it takes into account the fact that this wage rate will presumably hold for more than one period -except for the automatic revision. Now, let W * t (υ) denote the wage rate chosen in period t, and let h * t,T (υ) denote the hours worked in period T if household υ last reoptimized its wage in period t. According to eq.
Then, W * t (υ) is selected to maximize
where E υ t {·} is an expectation operator speciÞc to household υ that integrates over those future states of the world in which household υ has no reset its wage since t. Standard manipulations yield the approximate loglinear relation
whereπ w t andŵ t are the logdeviations of π w t and w t e −zt , respectively, and where we deÞned the parameters
Monetary Policy and Equilibrium
The monetary authority is assumed to obey an augmented Taylor rule of the form
This rule incorporates an interest rate smoothing component as well as feedback terms: monetary authorities react to current deviations of inßation as well as to the lagged deviations of the output gap. The latter is deÞned as the difference between the output and the level of production that would have obtained absent nominal rigidities.
In equilibrium, it must be the case thatĉ t =ŷ t . Combined with eq (22), the Þnal linear system can then be summarized as followŝ
This system is solved with the AIM package proposed by Anderson and Moore (1985) .
Model Calibration and Estimation
In this section, we describe the model calibration and the minimum distance estimation technique. We then, go on to expound our results.
Structural Parameters Calibration
We partition the model parameters into two groups. The Þrst one regroups the parameters which we calibrate prior to estimation. Let ψ 0 = (β, φ, s m , θ w , θ p , ω p ) 0 denote the vector of calibrated parameters. The calibration is summarized in table 1.
We Þrst set β = 0.99 as is conventional in the literature. Assuming that F is Cobb-Douglas,
i.e. y = n 1/φ , we set φ = 1/.5392, implying a labor share close of 53.92%, as in the data. Notice that we implicitly assume that proÞts are redistributed proportionately to factors income, so that 1/φ is indeed the steady state labor share. Accordingly, the deÞnition of ω p implies ω p = φ − 1.
We set s m = 0.5, implying that the share of material goods in value added is 50%. We set θ p = 10, so that the long-run markup charged by intermediate goods producers amounts to 11%. This value is consistent with estimates reported by Oliveira Martins and Scaperta (1999).
Finally, in line with Smets and Wouters (2003) , we set θ w = 5. Thus, the long-run markup charged by labor suppliers amounts to 25%, reßecting structural rigidities on the European labor markets.
Structural Parameters Estimation
Recall that we deÞned the data vector z t = (∆ŷ t ,π t ,π w t ,î t ) 0 . Now, for k ≥ 0, let us deÞne the vector collecting the dynamic response of the components of z t+k to a technology shock η s
In the sequel, we deÞne θ as
where the vec (·) operator stacks the columns of a matrix.
We regroup the model's structural coefficients which we seek to estimate in the vector ψ 1 = (η, γ w , γ p , α w , α p , ω w , ρ i , a π , a y , σ ) ) 0 . These structural coefficients are selected so as to solvê 
To obtain the parameters standard errors, we resort to the δ-function method. We start by taking a Þrst order Taylor expansion on the Þrst order condition associated with the minimization of G(ψ, β) in the neighborhood of the true parameters values. Then let us deÞne
Applying standard reasoning, we obtain
where Σ θ is the variance covariance matrix of θ and T is the sample size. In practice, all the partial derivatives are computed numerically at the point estimate. Notice Þnally that G (ψ, θ)
is asymptotically distributed as χ 2 (dim(θ) − dim(ψ 1 )).
Estimation Results
During the course of the estimation, we Þrst tried to estimate all the parameters in ψ 1 . Two parameters were characterized by binding constraints, namely ρ i = 0 and γ w = 1. In a second stage, we enforced these equalities and estimated the remaining parameters. This suggests that the degree of wage indexation to past wage inßation is very high and that European monetary authorities did not particularly smoothed the nominal interest rate. Another interpretation is that the model generates enough endogenous persistence via the feedback effects in eq. (22) that allowing for extra serial correlation inî t is not necessary. This interpretation is consistent with the view defended by Rudebusch (2002) on US data.
When it comes to the price setting side of the model, we obtain the following results. First, the probability of no price adjustment is α p = 0.7186, implying an average spell of no reoptimization of slightly more than three quarters and a half. This Þgure is consistent with microeconomic evidence reported by Dhyne et al. (2004) on euro area data. The degree of price indexation to past inßation is signiÞcant, with γ p = 0.4599. This implies that during each quarters, Þxed prices incorporate roughly 46% of past inßation. In contrast, the probability of no wage adjustment is α w = 0.5051, implying an average spell of no reoptimization of slightly more than two quarters. This result is somewhat surprising, given the conventional view that the European labor market is characterized by a lack of ßexibility.
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When it comes to preference parameters, we obtain standard results. First, the elasticity of marginal labor disutility is large, with ω w = 2.6975, but inprecisely estimated. This value is in line with previous estimates reported by Smets and Wouters, though somewhat higher. Second, given η = 0.4975 and β = 0.99, we easily deduce thatb = 0.8726. In our sample, we obtain g = 1.0051, so that b = 0.8770. Thus, the model requires a high degree of habit formation.
When it comes to the remaining monetary policy parameters, we obtain a x = 0.2548, suggesting a modest feedback effect of the output gap. Notice however that this parameter is not estimated very precisely. Second, a π = 1.5438, suggesting that over the past two decades, European monetary authorities reacted very sharply to the deviations of inßation, in accordance with the Taylor principle.
The standard error of technology shocks σ ) is close to 0.48%. This value is standard when compared with US estimates. However, it is difficult to compare this value with former studies on the euro area. The reason is that in most of these papers, technology and technology shocks are all assumed to be stationary.
Finally, the global speciÞcation test does not allow us to reject the model, with G (ψ, θ) = 33.195, with a p value of 99.34%. Table 2 reports our estimation results. Additionally, Þgure 3 plots the theoretical and empirical impulse responses as well as the 95% asymptotic conÞdence interval of the latter. 12 As is clear from the graph, the model does a good job of reproducing the main features of the empirical responses to a permanent technology shock. In particular, it captures well the protracted and hump-shaped declines of inßation, and the nominal interest rate. It does also a good job of reproducing the gradual decline in wage inßation. However, it is less successful at reproducing the initial inßexion of output growth.
A Counterfactual Experiment
Having estimated the structural parameters of our model, we are now in a position to conduct the following counterfactual experiment. Following the methodology advocated by Woodford (2003), we start by deriving monetary authorities' appropriate welfare objective and then go 12 Here, and in the following pictures, the size of the technology shock is normalized to one standard deviation.
21
on to compute the economy's response to a permanent technology shock under the optimal monetary policy, which we compare with our approximation of the actual responses.
Optimal Monetary Policy
Standard yet tedious calculations yield the approximate utility-based loss function
where t.i.p. stands for "terms independent of policy", and
and δ and κ are complicated functions of the structural parameters. 13 The values of λ p , λ w , λ x , and δ are reported in table 3. Notice that this approximate loss function closely resembles that derived by Giannoni and Woodford (2003) . This result was not warranted since our model differs from theirs due to the presence of permanent technology shocks and material goods. Notice also that due to our assumptions regarding wage indexation to past wage inßation, it is the quasi The monetary authorities' program consists in maximizing the (approximate) welfare criterion (28), subject to the structural constraintŝ 13 For further details, see Gianonni and Woodford (2003) , as well as our technical appendix.
whereŵ n t andλ n t are stochastic variables beyond the control of monetary authorities, 14 and where we deÞned the composite parameter
Solving the above program results in a system of Þrst order conditions and constraints that we solve, once again, with the AIM algorithm.
Results and Discussion
Having solved the new dynamic system, we can compute the economy's responses to a permanent technology shock under optimal monetary policy. These responses are reported in Þgure 5. For ease of comparison, we also report the responses implied by the structural model with a Taylor rule and those implied by the SVAR. Once again, we include the VAR-based conÞdence intervals.
As is clear from these pictures, it appears that the response of monetary authorities to a permanent technology shock, as summarized by the dynamics of the nominal interest rate, shares little resemblance with the optimal one. The latter implies a much more pronounced decline in the nominal interest rate and a much ßatter response of inßation than suggested by either the SVAR or the theoretical model with a Taylor rule. Interestingly, under the optimal monetary policy, wage inßation is hump-shaped. This behavior is consistent with the weight associated with (π w t − γ w π w t−1 ) 2 in the loss function, i.e. λ w , which is much smaller than λ p . Finally, there does not appear any marked difference between the behavior of output growth under optimal monetary policy and that under the Taylor rule, except maybe that the initial impact of a technology shock is higher under the optimal policy. Overall, based on these pictures, we are lead to conclude that the dynamic response of monetary authorities to a permanent technology shock was not optimal over our sample.
The amplitude of the initial decline of nominal interest rate in response to a technology shock under optimal monetary policy might seem too large. Thus, care should be taken when interpreting our results. As is well known in the literature, the optimal monetary policy calls for fairly volatile nominal interest rates. On this point, our paper is no exception. This, however, would no longer be the case if the model included an interest rate smoothing motive in the monetary authorities loss function, resulting for example from transaction frictions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed to conduct a counterfactual experiment designed to quantify the extent to which the historical systematic response of European monetary authorities to permanent technology shocks differs from the optimal response. To do so, we have characterized the euro area economy's responses to permanent technology shocks using standard long-run restrictions These conclusions call for some words of caution. First, under the assumed structure of the model, there is no interest rate smoothing motive for a benevolent policy maker desiring to maximize social welfare. As a result, the nominal interest rate exhibits a high volatility under the optimal monetary policy. It is a priori unclear whether including such a motive in the central bank loss function would modify our conclusion. Second, our empirical strategy has abstracted 24 from the convergence process of member countries which resulted in a downward trend in the aggregate inßation and nominal interest rates. Taking these trends into account is an interesting challenge for further research. 
